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Agricultural cooperatives continue to provide farmers with a means of joining 
together to solve their own problems. An increase in cooperative activity has 
occurred in specialty crop industries because producers in these industries 
often face unfavorable market conditions. Future cooperative development and 
functions in specialty crop industries are assessed through two methods. One 
guide of future cooperative development in an industry involves identifying 
market failures in the industry and their negative consequences that may lead to 
cooperative development. Examination of case studies of cooperative 
development and functions in other, similar specialty crop industries serves as a 
second guide. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
Agricultural cooperation has occurred since the origin of farming. In 
1922, the Capper-Volstead Act legally sanctioned agricultural cooperatives in 
the United States. Agricultural cooperatives are organizations formed and 
comprised of farmer-members. The activities of agricultural cooperatives "are 
conducted on a cost of doing business basis and are developed to increase 
farm income by improving the market for farm products and reducing the cost of 
farm supplies and related services" (Bogard, speech). Since agricultural 
cooperatives were first organized, their basic purpose has been to give groups 
of farmers an opportunity to serve their own needs and solve their own 
problems more effectively than they could acting individually (How, p.13). 
Through the application of economic theory, this paper analyzes the 
development and functions of cooperatives in specialty crop industries. Issues 
discussed include: why cooperatives form; the different kinds of cooperatives; 
the benefits and limitations of agricultural cooperation; the keys to a successful 
agricultural cooperative; and current and future issues that will influence the 
growth of cooperatives in agricultural industries. 
This discussion focuses on the formation and development of agricultural 
cooperatives in specialty crop industries because, due to the relatively small 
size of these industries and the often highly perishable nature of their crop, 
specialty crop producers frequently face difficult market conditions. Adverse 
circumstances such as extremely low product prices or insufficient market 
outlets often prompt the development of cooperatives in these industries. 
This paper addresses issues relating to specialty crops in general and 
applies them specifically to two specialty crop industries, the tart cherry industry 
and the farm-raised catfish industry. The formation and functions of 
cooperatives in these two agricultural industries are presented. Different 
cooperatives in the tart cherry and farm-raised catfish industries then are 
described and their benefits, limitations, and success rates are discussed. 
These two specialty crops represent industries at different stages of growth; the 
tart cherry industry is a well-established, mature market, while the catfish 
industry is relatively new--it's initial growth having only recently slowed down. 
This discussion of cooperatives in specialty crop industries and the case studies 
of the tart cherry and farm-raised catfish industries should assist participants in 
oth~r specialty crop industries at every stage of growth to understand the 
development and roles of cooperatives in their industry. 
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COOPERATIVE DEVELOPMENT AND FUNCTIONS 
REASONS FOR COOPERATIVE FORMATION 
Agricultural Market Failures 
A popular saying states that "cooperatives are born of necessity". Such 
necessity is often the result of market failures in agricultural industries. The role 
of market failures in cooperative development is explained by Reynold P. Dahl: 
Market failure refers to sub-optimal economic 
performance that results from imperfect competition in 
markets in which farmers sell their output or purchase 
farm supplies. The theory of the cooperative firm 
suggests that if farmers organize a cooperative in an 
imperfectly competitive market, they can bring about 
price, output, and efficiency results comparable to 
those associated with pure competition (Dahl, p.SO). 
This explanation of cooperative development is often called the "competitive 
yardstick" theory because it focuses on cooperatives' ability to inject competition 
into industries characterized by market failures (Rhodes). While the competitive 
yardstick theory is the most common and widely accepted rationale for 
cooperative development, there are two other, competing explanations: the 
coordination or supply management theory and the social school of thought 
(Christy, p.2S). The coordination theory asserts that the primary impetus of 
cooperative development is the improvement of the coordination of supply and 
demand for agricultural commodities to achieve prices consistent with 
production costs (Christy, p.26; Shaffer and Staatz). The social school of 
thought focuses less on economic issues such as market failures and supply 
and demand and more on the role of cooperatives in meeting the social needs 
of farmers (Christy, p.26). Without debating the various merits and drawbacks of 
these three theories, this paper will focus on the market failure/competitive 
yardstick explanation while incorporating aspects of the other two theories. 
As previously mentioned, market failures occur when the market for a 
commodity deviates from the model of perfect competition. In a perfectly 
competitive market: 
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(1) There is no product differentiation. 
(2) There are a large number of buyers and sellers of the commodity. 
(3) All firms have access to perfect information about the market. 
(4) There are no barriers to entry and exit. 
In contrast, the markets for most agricultural products have the following 
characteristics: 
(1) There is very little product differentiation. 
(2) There are a large number of producer-sellers, but a small 
number of buyers. 
(3) Sellers do not have access to perfect market information. 
(4) Sellers are not free to enter or exit these markets easily. 
Characteristic (1 )--product differentiation--differs little between the model of 
perfect competition and the markets for agricultural products. Characteristics 
(2), (3) and (4) of agricultural markets, however, represent significant deviations 
from the model of perfect competition. These three examples of market failure 
will now be discussed in more detail. 
Markets for agricultural commodities are frequently comprised of a large 
number of farmers attempting to sell to few buyers. This is particularly true of 
local markets for agricultural commodities. The presence of few buyers of a 
good is the primary characteristic of an oligopsonistic market. Buyers in this 
market are called oligopsonists. Oligopsonistic markets put producers in an 
unfavorable position because markets where growers have few or only one 
selling alternative are often characterized by structural or long-term market 
power (Sexton, Nov. 1986, p.14). Oligopsonists, who do not have to compete 
for supplies, are in a position of power relative to agricultural producers, who 
must sell their crop to repay production or other loans. Often, the small number 
of buyers in an agricultural market is due to large economies of scale in 
processing or marketing which prevent individual growers or smaller firms from 
economically performing the sarne functions. 
Insufficient access to necessary market information is another market 
failure and a cause of market power imbalance (King). In his discussion of 
cooperative bargaining, Ralph B. Bunje lists market intelligence as a major 
weakness of the individual farmer. "Those farmers who do have the time to 
study their market find that the basic information they need to make rational 
marketing decisions is either not available, incomplete, or inaccurate" (Bunje, 
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pA1). Buyers, in contrast, are often better informed and have more resources to 
discover necessary market information. 
Accurate market information is important in the price discovery process; 
producers' lack of market information can result in farmers receiving a price for 
their goods below that which the market would dictate. In order to make long­
term production decisions, agricultural producers need accurate market 
information about a number of different factors. Producers must have access to 
information on future consumer demand for their product, and they must be 
aware of factors affecting future supply, such as product growth characteristics 
and weather patterns. Some information, such as weather, cannot be 
definitively determined, while information about product growth can be 
confusing or ambiguous. Lacking this information, producers are unable to 
efficiently and accurately coordinate their supply with future consumer demand. 
Finally, agricultural producers often are faced with barriers to market 
entry and, in particular, barriers to exit in the market for which they produce. 
Farmers can be locked into the production of a particular agricultural commodity 
for a variety of reasons, such as high levels of capital investment or inability to 
produce other crops or commodities, due to poor alternative uses for the land or 
lack of necessary knowledge (Bunje, p.37). When farmers must produce the 
same crop regardless of market conditions, they have limited options when 
faced with unfavorable market practices resulting from a high degree of buyer 
market power. 
Consequences of Agricultural Market Failures 
In industries characterized by these market failures, agricultural 
producers are at a clear disadvantage. They can be forced to deal with buyers 
who have a wide selection of suppliers, who have better market information, 
and who typically have a smaller capital investment per unit of production 
(Bunje, pAO). The combination of these factors maximizes the market power of 
buyers and minimizes, and can even eliminate, the market power of farmer­
sellers. Producers' lack of market power often is expressed through 
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unfavorable economic conditions which are imposed on them in many 
agricultural sectors. 
One indication of a high degree of market power imbalance is producer 
prices below the cost of production. Such prices can result either from buyers 
setting the price too low or from competing sellers bidding the price down below 
profitable levels. In agricultural markets, sellers often are subject to widely 
variable, unstable prices for their production, which further increase the risks of 
farming. 
Oligopsonists are also likely to be paying different prices to different 
farmers for no economically justified reason. Such price discriminating 
behavior is achieved by "playing farmers off against one another and attempting 
to discern each's minimum selling price for farm production" (Sexton and Iskow, . 
p.7). 
Another primary way in which oligopsonists may exert market power is by 
enforcing terms of trade that are "irritating, costly, and unfair" to growers (Bunje, 
p.44). Terms of trade include nonprice factors such as grades and standards, 
time and conditions of payment, hauling allowances, furnishing of containers by 
processors, and bypassed acreage (Biggs, pAl. Strict volume and quality 
requirements, last minute price offers, and the need to pay transportation costs 
can greatly increase risks to producers and decrease their income. 
Furthermore, because buyers have a number of suppliers to choose 
from, they often are not concerned about fostering the goodwill of individual 
producers. As a result, buyers can become undependable outlets for individual 
farmers. 
In theory, perfectly competitive markets compel market participants to 
function optimally. The lack of competition inherent in an oligopsonistic 
structure permits buyers to function below this optimal level. Thus, buyers in 
agricultural markets, such as processors or marketers, may provide inadequate 
or inefficient services. 
Any combination of the negative effects of market power imbalance may 
prompt farmers to form an agricultural cooperative. Farmers may form a 
cooperative in reaction to extremely low producer prices, unfair terms of trade, 
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variable prices or market outlets, inefficient services, or a combination of these 
factors. The kind of cooperative formed ultimately depends upon the specific 
economic factors existent in the market. The different kinds of cooperatives and 
their functions will be disclJssed in a later section. 
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COOPERATIVES IN SPECIALTV CROP INDUSTRIES 
Cooperative involvement has traditionally been strong in specialty crop 
industries. Specialty crops are crops that are not considered primary 
agricultural products. Specialty crops include, but are not limited to: fruits, 
vegetables, nuts, berries, mushrooms, Christmas trees, herbs, honey, 
aquaculture, nursery stock, and floriculture (Jermolowicz and Stafford, p.4). 
Due to the nature of specialty crop industries, producers for these 
markets are particularly susceptible to market power abuse. In their article in 
the July 1987 issue of Farmer Cooperatives. Andrew Jermolowicz and Thomas 
H. Stafford list various characteristics of specialty crops and their industries that 
may present obstacles to producers of these crops. 
One important characteristic of some specialty crops is their perishability. 
The perishable nature of specialty crops can put producers at a disadvantage if 
they rely on an outside processing or marketing source. Specialty crops require 
a short time from harvest to market, and a processor or marketer could take 
advantage of this time pressure to force down the price paid for the product. 
Another characteristic of specialty crop industries is the limited markets 
they often face. Specialty crops such as Christmas trees face seasonal 
markets, while others, such as shitake mushrooms, face thin markets. Thin or 
seasonal demand may increase competition between suppliers, thereby 
increasing buyer market power and, most likely, decreasing price. 
As in other agricultural industries, farmers may be at a disadvantage if 
they are locked into the production of a specialty crop. "Because many 
[specialty] crops require specialized production, harvesting, handling, and 
packing practices, capital investment can be high" (Jermolowicz and Stafford, 
p.4). High capital investment in production often cannot be easily disposed of, 
thus creating a barrier to market exit. In addition, high capital investment 
requirements in packing or processing have led to fewer firms operating on 
these levels. Producers of specialty crops stand to suffer from this trend: 
Processors of fruit[s] and vegetables are becoming fewer, 
larger, and more specialized...They have become more 
specific in their requirements for product quantity, quality, 
8 
and delivery terms...As a result, individual farmers find 
themselves at a competitive disadvantage (Biggs, p.1). 
Producers in many specialty crop industries, particularly fruits and vegetables, 
have responded to this disadvantage by forming cooperatives. In the fruit and 
vegatable industries, for example, it is estimated that cooperatives handle 
approximately one quarter of the total quantity of production from U.S. farms 
(How, p.169). 
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AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES AND THEIR FUNCTIONS 
Cooperatives can be broadly classified as either operational or 
bargaining (How, p.164). Generally, operational cooperatives seek increased 
net returns through greater efficiency, while bargaining cooperatives strive to 
raise market prices and increase net returns by increasing gross revenue. 
The key factor distinguishing the two groups is the concept of vertical 
integration. Vertical integration can be defined as participation by a business in 
two or more stages of the total production process (VanSickle, p.14). Possible 
stages of the production process include: manufacturing or purchasing of 
production inputs; production; assembly; processing; packaging; transportation; 
wholesaling; and marketing. Vertical integration can occur through contracts 
between operations at different stages of the production process, or through 
one business owning operations at different production stages. 
When an agricultural producer vertically integrates and expands his 
production operation into other stages of the production process, he engages 
either in "upstream" vertical integration by supplying the production unit's own 
inputs, or in "downstream" vertical integration by moving into production stages 
closer to consumers (Sexton and Iskow, p.2). Often it is beneficial for 
agricultural producers to jointly vertically integrate. 
Operational Agricultural Cooperatives 
Operational agricultural cooperatives are organizations through which 
farmers may "address market failure by jointly vertically integrating themselves 
into the market chain" (Sexton and Iskow, p.iv). Agricultural producers form 
operational cooperatives to increase efficiency in other stages of the production 
process or to continue the provision of services if investor-owned firms 
providing necessary services leave the market. The most common forms of 
operational agricultural cooperatives are supply cooperatives, processing 
cooperatives, and marketing cooperatives. 
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Supply Cooperatives 
Supply cooperatives are organized by agricultural producers in an 
attempt to procure their production inputs more efficiently and at a lower cost. 
Supply cooperatives are an example of "upstream" vertical integration, because 
through them farmers participate in stages of the production process prior to the 
actual production of agricultural goods. 
There are two different ways in which supply cooperatives operate. 
Supply cooperatives either make bulk purchases of necessary production 
inputs or they manufacture their own inputs. The benefits of purchasing supply 
cooperatives are described by Jermolowicz and Stafford: 
Supply cooperatives, organized to purchase essential 
supplies and materials, are very beneficial to producers. 
For example, a cooperative's ability to pass on savings 
from bulk purchases of plants, fertilizer, chemicals, or 
containers will lower the per-unit input cost for growers 
patronizing the association. With lower production costs, 
growers are in a better position to increase returns 
(Jermolowicz and Stafford, p.5). 
The second kind of supply cooperative benefits its members by 
manUfacturing inputs needed in production. Supply cooperatives in the fruit 
industries, for example, have established manufacturing plants to manufacture 
input machinery such as mechanical harvesters (Bogard, speech). Supply 
cooperatives may be able to manufacture inputs more efficiently, thus 
decreasing input costs and increasing final returns to producers. 
Supply cooperatives assist producers in avoiding negative 
consequences of market failure in agricultural industries. If only a few sources 
of production inputs exist, a supply cooperative can lower input prices by 
injecting competition into the market. If there is no supply outlet, a supply 
cooperative can allow producers to keep producing by creating a source for 
necessary production inputs. A supply cooperative can also be the answer to 
undependable or inefficient supply outlets. Furthermore, supply cooperatives, 
because their members are farmers, can better coordinate the production 
supplies that are offered with the needs of producers. 
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Processing Cooperatives 
Agricultural processing cooperatives are formed by agricultural 
producers to provide an economical and efficient processing outlet for their 
production. Examples of agricultural processing include fruit and vegetable 
canning or freezing, dried fruit and nut processing, fish processing, and rice 
milling. Since processing is a stage in the production process closer to 
consumers, processing cooperatives represent "downstream" vertical 
integration. 
Oftentimes, agricultural producers are prevented from performing their 
own processing by economies of size. Where processing economies of size 
exist, it is prohibitively expensive for farmers to perform processing individually. 
If a group of growers join together, however, unit costs of processing decrease 
and processing becomes economically feasible. Richard J. Sexton and Julie 
Iskow offer examples of agricultural processing economies of size in their 
paper, "Factors Critical to the Success or Failure of Emerging Agricultural 
Cooperatives". Their paper contains a table listing the number of average-size 
farms per minimum efficient processing plant for different farm industries. In the 
vegetable and melon industries, for example, 1,635 average farms are needed 
to amass the necessary volume to run a minimum size efficient canning plant. 
Similarly, the minimum number of average fruit and tree nut farms needed to 
run an efficient canning plant is 2,862 (Sexton and Iskow, p.3). Agricultural 
processing cooperatives are one means by which farmers may consolidate the 
necessary volume to efficiently process their product. Hence, processing 
cooperatives tend to have many members and process large volumes (Smith 
and Wallace, p.6). 
Another benefit of agricultural processing cooperatives is that they have· 
the potential to expand demand at the retail level by improving quality and 
through the creation of new value-added products. By processing members' 
products into different forms or foods, processing cooperatives can expand or 
retain markets for their output (Mather and Preston, p.?). 
Processing cooperatives can help agricultural producers counteract 
negative effects of market failure, in particular, the problems arising from the 
existence of a small number of buyers. Processing cO'operatives can help 
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producers avoid the consequences of market power imbalance, such as 
extremely low producer prices, unfavorable terms of trade, and undependable, 
inefficient services. Processing cooperatives often raise prices, and they 
provide producers with a fair, dependable market outlet for their production. 
Marketing Cooperatives 
The primary aim of marketing cooperatives is to develop wholesale and 
retail markets for speci'fic agricultural products. They achieve this aim by 
offering products at the times and in the forms, places and quantities that satisfy 
wholesale and retail demand. Packaging, distribution, storage, sales, and 
domestic and export market development are all functions performed by 
marketing cooperatives. These functions represent the participation of farmers 
in stages of the production process closer to consumers; marketing 
cooperatives therefore represent another example of "downstream" vertical 
integration. 
As is the case for processing, farmers often do not have the necessary 
productive capacity required to market their product efficiently. This is a 
particularly important consideration for fruit and vegetable and other specialty 
crop farmers who wish to sell to high volume outlets such as grocery chain 
stores. "Marketing cooperatives representing the interests of several producers, 
can more easily attract and retain commercial buyers with their ability to 
consolidate member product and provide volume shipments" (Jermolowicz and 
Stafford, p.5). Marketing cooperatives also satisfy wholesale and retail demand 
by providing products of a specified grade or quality and by providing 
agricultural products in attractive and convenient packaging. 
Marketing cooperatives help producers address the problem of market 
power imbalance resulting from the presence of few buyers and many sellers. 
They do this by helping producers adapt to terms of trade, e.g. volume 
requirements, that they would not be able to fulfill individually. 
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Agricultural Bargaining Cooperatives 
Unlike operational cooperatives, bargaining cooperatives are not an 
example of joint vertical integration. Agricultural producers organize into 
bargaining cooperatives to achieve common goals, but in the process they do 
not extend their production operations into any other stage of the production 
process. Individual farmers may vertically integrate outside the bargaining 
cooperative, either individually or through membership in another cooperative 
form, e.g., a marketing cooperative. 
The primary function of cooperative bargaining associations is to 
negotiate between economic agents at different stages of the production 
process. A bargaining cooperative, for instance, might negotiate between 
growers and processors or between processors and marketers. Cooperative 
bargaining associations typically do not physically handle agricultural products. 
The basic aim of cooperative bargaining associations is to establish the highest 
price and best terms of trade that can be economically justified by supply and 
demand and other market conditions (Rhodes, p.320). The price negotiated by 
a bargaining association is also restricted by the Capper-Volstead Act, which 
calls for investigation into cases of "undue price enhancement" by agricultural 
cooperatives. 
A second major role of a cooperative bargaining association is to provide 
its members with timely, accurate market intelligence (Bunje. p.41). Other goals 
of cooperative bargaining include price stabilization, creation of new markets. 
and expansion of assured markets (Marion, p.88). 
Cooperative bargaining associations have achieved a number of these 
goals and have played a significant role in some industries. Bargaining 
cooperatives have been prevented from achieving success in other instances 
because of their inherent limitations which will be discussed later. 
The most tangible benefit of cooperative bargaining is its long-term effect 
on prices: "Net prices are a little higher, on the average, than they would have 
been [without cooperative bargaining]. Prices are likely to be more stable from 
year to year. Moreover, prices may be more equitable among producers within 
the group" (Rhodes, p.321). 
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Bargaining associations are able to achieve their price goals in part 
because they tend to increase producers' market power. Ralph B. Bunje, the 
long-time manager of the California Canning Peach Association, states that "[a] 
farm bargaining association tends to equalize bargaining power by denying to 
buyers the natural advantages that have been theirs by default" (Bunje, p.4D). 
Bunje then equates bargaining power with superior market knowledge. Bunje's 
evaluation thus suggests that bargaining associations can increase their 
members' bargaining power through the provision of accurate, detailed market 
information. 
Cooperative bargaining associations may also benefit the entire market 
for an agricultural product. Bruce W. Marion, in his book about the U.S. food 
system, states that cooperative bargaining "may well move a market 
characterized by unequal market power in the direction of efficiency," and in the 
process move the market toward a more nearly equitable state (Marion, p.91). 
Sexton and Iskow, comparing cooperatives, give this endorsement of 
bargaining cooperatives: 
It is probably the best of all possible worlds if farmers' 
price enhancement goals can be attained through a 
bargaining cooperative. The financial commitment is less 
than for a marketing cooperative, and concerns about 
achieving production efficiency in marketing are not 
relevant (Sexton and Iskow, p.8). 
Bargaining cooperatives' benefits to producers stem 'from their 
effectiveness in helping producers avoid negative consequences of two 
important market failures: the presence of few buyers in a market and 
producers' lack of market information. Bargaining associations gather and 
disseminate important market information, helping producers to make better 
informed decisions, and they enable many producers to act as one, thus 
evening out market power imbalance. 
Bargaining cooperatives, however, do have problems and limitations. In 
general, cooperative bargaining associations achieve their goals in two ways: 
(1) They play the firms they bargain with against each other, causing them to bid 
up prices; or (2) They threaten to form a cooperative to perform the services 
currently performed by the firm with which they are bargaining. For example, a 
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bargaining cooperative negotiating with an investor-owned marketing firm might 
threaten to form a marketing cooperative (Sexton and Iskow, p.8). Both of these 
tactics require that a bargaining cooperative have control of a substantial share 
of the supply of an agricultural product. In situations when control of such a 
share of supply is not possible, bargaining cooperatives suffer severe 
limitations. 
Industry-wide cooperative bargaining associations are not likely to 
succeed in controlling the supply of an agricultural product when there is a 
widespread diversification of production across geographical areas (Sexton, 
1987, p. 18). Such dispersion makes it difficult for a bargaining cooperative to 
exercise complete control over supply. A bargaining cooperative on a local 
level, however, may be able to avoid this problem. 
Another problem may be faced by growers trying to form a bargaining 
cooperative to negotiate with a small number of large buyers. "If the one or few 
firms are strongly opposed to a group effort by what they paternalistically refer to 
as 'our growers,' they may be able to stop the bargaining association before it 
even bargains" (Rhodes, p.323). 
The most serious threat to the success of a bargaining cooperative, 
however, is not caused by an outside force; it is posed by agricultural producers 
within the industry. Because bargaining cooperatives are voluntary 
organizations, producers may choose not to join the cooperative. These 
producers are then able to "free ride" by enjoying the price enhancement and 
other benefits achieved by the bargaining cooperative without paying dues or 
restricting their supply. The presence of free-riders in a market is not a 
sustainable condition. Other producers soon follow their lead, and the 
bargaining cooperative loses control of industry supply and eventually 
collapses. The presence of free riders will be particularly pronounced when the 
only service provided by the bargaining cooperative is to set price. One study 
found that some bargaining cooperatives try to reduce the incentives to free ride 
by providing additional services to their members such as market information, 
newsletters, public relations, fieldmen, legislative representation, research, 
commodity programs and industry representation (Marion, p.89). A strong and 
committed membership is an important part of a bargaining cooperative's long­
term success in achieving its goals. 
16 
Other Cooperatives 
Many cooperatives in agricultural industries are a combination of these 
four kinds. Many processing cooperatives, for example, started as bargaining 
cooperatives; some marketing cooperatives do their own processing. A further 
complication of this review of cooperative forms is that agricultural producers 
often have the option of belonging to more than one kind of cooperative. An 
agricultural producer, for example, may belong to both a supply and a 
marketing cooperative. Furthermore, cooperatives can themselves hold 
memberships in other cooperatives; a processing cooperative whose members 
are producers may itself be a member in a marketing cooperative. Although this 
discussion of the forms of cooperatives has focused on the four basic kinds 
(supply, processing, marketing, and bargaining), agricultural cooperatives often 
involve various functions and intricate relationships. 
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BENEFrrs AND LIMITATIONS OF AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVES 
Benefits 
Agricultural cooperatives most noticeably benefit their members when 
they are formed to provide a service that is not available elsewhere. By 
providing services where none exist, the cooperative fultills its most 
fundamental objective--to serve the needs of its members. Services often are 
unavailable in agricultural markets because for-profit firms have little incentive 
to offer them. Sexton and Iskow list three reasons why an agricultural 
cooperative may be able to operate successfully in markets that no for-profit 
company will serve: 
1.	 A cooperative may be able to operate more efficiently than unsuccessful for­
profit firms. 
2.	 The farmer-members of an agricultural cooperative probably will be willing 
to accept a lower return on investment than the owners of for-profit 
companies. 
3.	 An agricultural cooperative can extract more value from product marketing 
by instituting flexible pricing mechanisms. For example, a marketing 
cooperative can pay members different prices for their product based on the 
marginal revenue that can be received for the next unit of production, and 
then charge a membership fee to cover marketing costs (Sexton and Iskow, 
p.16). 
Many processing cooperatives, for example, have been formed after 
large, for-profit processing firms closed down. Processing cooperatives have 
been organized to preserve their members' markets. They have achieved this 
goal by continuing the proximate demand for members' products, by preserving 
farmers' link to markets, and by protecting members' production investments. 
One such cooperative is Paci'fic Coast Producers, which was formed to process 
growers' fruits and vegetables after a large cannery closed (Mather and 
Preston, p.7). 
A second benefit of agricultural cooperatives, one which often most 
interests farmers, is their ability to raise the net profits of their members. 
Cooperatives can raise their members' net profits by either increasing gross 
farm revenues or decreasing total farm costs. 
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Cooperatives are well situated to lower their members' total costs 
because they operate on an at-cost basis. Instead of trying to make a profit off 
their farmer-members, cooperatives sell supplies to their members at the price 
at which they were bought, and pay their members the price for which they sold 
their products, less any operating expenses. This system reduces farmers' 
costs because they do not pay for the profit-margins of investor-owned 
suppliers, processors, and marketers. 
Another way agricultural cooperatives reduce member costs is by 
reducing per-unit supply, handling, or processing costs by assembling large 
volumes. By doing this, cooperatives allow producers to benefit from 
economies of scale at each stage of the production process. 
On the other side of equation, cooperatives increase farmers' gross 
revenues through three principal means: controlling the flow of production, 
developing new markets, and improving product quality. 
Effective control of the flow of production can raise producer revenues by 
decreasing the available supply of agricultural products. Controlling the flow of 
agricultural production to the market was addressed in the discussion of 
bargaining cooperatives, during which the limitations of this tactic were 
discussed. As previously mentioned, supply control is not likely to be effective 
except, perhaps, on a local level. 
Developing new markets for agricultural products can raise farmer 
revenues by increasing consumer demand for their products. Cooperatives can 
develop new markets through new product development and activities such as 
promotion and advertising. 
Similarly, improving quality can raise farmer revenues by increasing 
demand for their product at other stages of the production process. 
Cooperatives are particularly able to improve product quality. One reason 
cooperatives have this potential is that cooperatives improve coordination 
between market demand and supply. Agricultural cooperatives can "encourage 
production oriented to market requirements by developing producer payment 
plans based upon meeting grade, size, time, and other market specifications" 
(Mather and Preston, p.5). Furthermore, cooperatives may be able to offer 
19
 
better quality production when compared with private handlers of farm products 
because non-cooperative firms at times will have incentives to skimp on quality 
(Sexton and Iskow, p.12). When this is the case, an agricultural cooperative 
may be able to substantially increase farmer gross revenues if it is able to offer 
clear improvements in product quality. 
A third major benefit of agricultural cooperatives is that they inject 
competition into noncompetitive markets. "Cooperatives, due to their nonprofit 
and service-at-cost nature, tend to push performance closer to the competitive 
norm." Cooperatives accomplish this because "they bring more to market at a 
higher producer price than would be the case if all firms were profit-seeking" 
(Mather and Preston, p.6). The competitive influence of cooperatives is 
particularly important because, by pushing agricultural markets closer to perfect 
competition, cooperatives decrease the market power of large buyers in the 
industry and increase the market power of agricultural producers. 
Another benefit of agricultural cooperatives that is extremely important to 
their members is risk reduction. By providing steady, dependable outlets, by 
expanding markets, and by equalizing market power within agricultural 
industries, cooperatives reduce producers' risk by establishing consistent, 
stable markets and prices for agricultural production. 
A final benefit of agricultural cooperatives arises from the fact that they 
are democratically owned and controlled by their farmer-members. Richard 
Richard J. Sexton explains this benefit in reference to marketing cooperatives: 
By forming cooperatives to market their products, growers 
remove the conflict of interest between buyer and seller. 
The cooperative marketing association wants to pay its 
member producers the highest possible price subject to 
covering costs (Sexton, Nov. 1986, p.14). 
This benefit is equally true for other cooperatives that directly transact with their 
members, such as supply cooperatives and processing cooperatives. 
Limitations 
Agricultural cooperatives have a number of limitations, some of which 
have already been discussed. AgriCUltural cooperatives are limited in their 
ability to increase producer returns by the fact that they have traditionally been 
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unable to fix prices of agricultural goods. Cooperatives' lack of success in price 
fixing has primarily been due to their inability to control production. Another 
factor limiting cooperatives' ability to fix agricultural product prices is elastic 
consumer demand for agricultural products. Often, if the price of an agricultural 
product goes up. consumers react by purchasing less of the product and more 
of substitute products. Thus, even a cooperative with complete control of the 
supply of an agricultural product cannot raise prices above what consumers are 
willing to pay without ultimately losing revenue. 
Another limitation of agricultural cooperatives is summa.rized by J. 
Warren Mather and Homer J. Preston: "Cooperatives generally cannot short­
circuit the marketing system or functions within it" (Mather and Preston, p.19). 
While cooperatives sometimes can eliminate middlemen in the marketing 
system, marketing functions cannot be eliminated; any functions previously 
performed by middlemen must now be performed by the cooperative. 
Sexton and Iskow identify two common weaknesses of agricultural 
cooperatives: difficulty in obtaining equity capital and failure to reward 
entrepreneurial activity (Sexton and Iskow, p.46). Cooperatives that return all 
their profits, less operating costs, to members cannot retain equity within their 
operation. A lack of equity capital can stunt the growth of an agricultural 
cooperative. 
The democratic nature of agricultural cooperatives, while beneficial in 
other ways, can also stunt cooperative growth by discouraging entrepreneurial 
activity. Decisions made by group consensus, in particular, can inhibit the 
progress of individual ideas. 
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AGRICULTURAL COOPERATIVE KEYS TO SUCCESS 
The popular saying asserts that "cooperatives are born of necessity." 
Sexton and Iskow, in their report on the success and failure of emerging 
agricultural cooperatives, concur: 
The first key to successfully developing an agricultural 
cooperative is that the organization have a genuine 
economic role to play. The cooperative must be able to 
provide net benefits for its members in excess of what is 
available through other market channels (Sexton and 
Iskow, p.18). 
Given that farmers often form cooperatives in response to a perceived need in 
the marketplace, it seems likely that most cooperatives would succeed under 
this criterion. This assumption is reinforced by statistical data on the prevalence 
of cooperatives. 
The number of agricultural cooperatives in the United States has steadily 
declined since 1928. Despite declining numbers, however, cooperatives' 
farmgate market share rose from 20% of marketing sales in 1950 to about 30% 
in the 1980's. Sexton evaluates these numbers: 
In assessing cooperatives' recent economic performance, 
the rising share statistics speak for themselves. Utility­
maximizing farmers would not have turned increasingly to 
cooperatives if they did not represent the best available 
option (Sexton, Dec. 1986, p.1171). 
The second key to success Sexton and Iskow identify is a well-planned 
and efficient organizational, financial, and operational framework within the 
cooperative. "Even cooperatives that are born of necessity may fail if they lack 
sufficient membership and volume, are improperly financed, or are poorly 
managed" (Sexton and Iskow, p.1). 
A third key to success that can be added to Sexton and Iskow's list is that 
cooperatives must be aware of current trends and factors that influence them 
and be flexible and able to adapt to change. 
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CURRENT FACTORS INFLUENCING AGRICULTURAL
 
COOPERA1"IVES
 
Sexton, in a December 1986 article, identifies emerging factors shaping 
agricultural cooperatives, three of which are relevant today: 
(1)	 Greater price and income volatility due to reduced government involvement 
in agriculture and increased international competition; 
(2)	 Fewer and larger marketing sector 'firms; 
(3)	 Fewer, larger, and more specialized farms. 
As discussed in the section on cooperative benefits, one reason farmers 
join agricultural cooperatives is to try to establish more stable market outlets for 
their production. Thus, a trend toward greater price and income instability may 
lead to increased cooperation in agricultural industries. 
A trend toward fewer and larger marketing sector firms leaves agricultural 
producers with less selling options and increases the market power of the 
remaining buyers. Buyers may exercise their increased influence by increasing 
their demands and paying lower prices. This, in turn, may lead more farmers to 
organize marketing cooperatives to provide the same services or to develop 
bargaining cooperatives to try to counteract the increased market power of the 
few, large marketing firms. 
The third factor, fewer and larger farms, is part of a larger trend toward a 
bimodal size distribution of farms. Increasingly, the number of medium-sized 
farms has decreased while the number of small and large farms has increased. 
The trend toward more small farms may curtail the growth of agricultural 
cooperatives. Studies have shown that farmers operating small farms are less 
likely to be members of an agricultural cooperative than other farmers (Sexton, 
1987, p.18). 
The trend toward larger farms holds mixed consequences for agricultural 
cooperatives. On one hand, a trend toward more large farms joining 
cooperatives would enhance cooperatives' prospects for production control. In 
addition, cooperatives whose members are primarily large ,farms will face lower 
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transactions costs in organizing, due to concentration of production (Sexton, 
Dec. 1986, p.1171). 
The trend toward larger farms, however, holds possible negative 
consequences for cooperatives. One negative consequence is explained by 
David K. Smith and Henry N. Wallace: 
Increases in farm size, and to a lesser extent changes in 
processing technology that allow more flexibility in 
scheduling processing of the raw product at harvest, will 
have the impact of increasing growers' opportunities for 
individual vertical integration without investment in a 
cooperative (Smith and Wallace, p.18). 
Thus, the trend toward larger farms may lead farms to individually undertake 
services that would be provided by a cooperative. 
Sexton offers suggestions on ways agricultural cooperatives can attract 
large farms. These include: "basing voting on patronage rather on one person­
one vote and amending patronage finance to include volume discounts, price 
premiums. etc." (Sexton, Dec. 1986, p.1171). 
This section has discussed cooperatives in specialty crop industries in 
general. Reasons for cooperative formation were described from the point of 
view of market failures in specialty crop industries and the consequences of 
market failures. Different kinds of cooperatives and their functions were then 
described. The benefits and limitations of cooperatives in specialty crop 
industries were examined. Finally, cooperative keys to success were 
addressed and current factors influencing agricultural cooperatives were 
discussed. 
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CASE STUDY 1: THE U.S. TART CHERRY INDUSTRY 
COOPERATIVES IN THE U.S. TART CHERRY INDUSTRY 
Tart cherries are a minor, specialty crop in the United States. Tart 
cherries are extremely perishable and virtually the entire crop is processed. 
Tart cherries are initially processed into four basic forms: frozen, canned, pie 
filling, and juice. A recent trend in the tart cherry industry is toward more frozen 
cherries and less canning. Most frozen tart cherries are remanufactured into 
prepared desserts, such as pies and tarts. Thus, other pie fruits such as apples, 
blueberries and peaches are important competing commodities. Next to 
apples, tart cherries are the second most important pie fruit in the U.S. (RHC, 
p.5). 
Tart cherry production is very geographically concentrated: Michigan 
alone produces 70-75% of the annual tart cherry crop. In the United States, tart 
cherries are produced by over two thousand growers (Ricks, p.243). Tart cherry 
trees have a regular bearing cycle; they begin to bear cherries five to ten years 
after they are planted and continue to produce for 20 to 25 years. All of these 
factors affect the formation and functions of agricultural cooperatives in the tart 
cherry industry. 
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REASONS FOR COOPERATIVE FORMATION IN
 
THE TART CHERRY INDUSTRY
 
Market Failures 
. Many of the reasons for agricultural cooperation in the tart cherry industry 
can be traced back to market failures within the industry and to ways in which 
the tart cherry industry deviates from the model of the perfectly competitive 
market. One such market failure is the existence of many sellers but few buyers 
for tart cherries at different levels in the marketing system. In the market for raw 
cherries between producers and processors, a relatively large number of 
producers have traditionally sold cherries to a smaller number of processor­
buyers. Recently the number of processor-buyers has increased, but locally, 
growers often still have only two to five alternative buyers. Thus, this market 
might be described as a local or regional oligopsony (RHC, p.21). 
An oligopsonistic structure is also apparent at a different level of the 
production process: the market for frozen cherries. This market has traditionally 
involved many tart cherry processors selling frozen cherries to a few large 
dessert manufacturers. Recently, the number of processor-sellers has grown, 
as more growers have started performing their own processing, while the large 
food manufacturers have become fewer and more concentrated (Marion, 
p.181). Thus, the selling side of the frozen cherry market is becoming even 
more competitive while the buying side is becoming increasingly oligopsonistic 
(RHC, p.70). 
Another market failure in the tart cherry industry that disadvantages 
producers is lack of necessary market information. One way to balance supply 
and demand would require transmitting information regarding expected 
consumer demands for 5-10 years in the future back to the growers so they 
could make the necessary investments in orchards (RHC, p.41). Consumer 
demand information for 5-10 years in the future is needed due to the lag time 
between when new cherry trees are planted and when they begin to bear fruit. 
Unfortunately, future consumer demand information is generally not available. 
Thus, producers frequently must make production volume and planting 
decisions based on demand and market prices from recent past years. This 
26
 
system assumes that the past will be repeated, an unlikely assumption which 
often leads producers to over- or under-produce. 
Expected consumer demand data, however, is not the most critical piece 
of market information that tart cherry producers lack. Product characteristics, in 
particular the effects of the bearing cycle, and variable weather patterns are the 
most important factors that dictate tart cherry production. Producers' lack of 
information in these two areas directly influences the element most responsible 
for the formation of agricultural cooperatives in the tart cherry industry: wide 
fluctuations in tart cherry supplies. The supply of tart cherries drastically 
changes from year to year, recently ranging from 140 to 310 million pounds 
(see Figure 1). The 1976 crop of tart cherries, for example, was only 48% of the 
1975 crop (RHC, p.2,11). 
Donald J. Ricks traces the source of production fluctuations back to two 
primary factors: 
(1)	 Long-term cycles of the relationship between industry orchard 
productive capacity and overall demand for tart cherries, and 
(2)	 Wide annual fluctuations in the nation's tart cherry production (Ricks, 
p.243). 
One the primary causes of the long-term cycle is the bearing cycle of tart 
cherry trees. Ricks describes the course of the long-term cycle: 
During each cycle there is typically a shortage period or 
phase. This is followed by a period of expanding 
production in which supply and demand are in 
approximate balance. Then there is a period of 
overproduction and low grower prices. Growers begin to 
remove acreage and a period of declining production 
occurs. Several years later another shortage period 
occurs and then the cycle begins again (Ricks, p.243). 
Because of the tart cherry tree bearing cycle, producers are unable to quickly 
and efficiently respond to positive market price signals. If prices are high due to 
a cherry shortage. producers who plant new trees must wait five to ten years for 
the resulting expanded cherry volume. By this time, the demand for cherries 
may have fallen and may be inadequate to permit sales of the increased 
production at prices that will cover production costs (RHC, p.45). 
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FIG. 1: U.S. TART CHERRY PRODUCTION AND GROWER PRICES 1940-1990
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The long term production cycles are exacerbated by annual fluctuations 
in tart cherry production. Annual fluctuations are primarily caused by killing 
spring freezes. Due to the geographic concentration of tart cherry production, 
the ·same weather conditions affect much of the nation's cherry crop (RHC, 
p.11). Contributing to the effects of weather fluctuations is the tendency of tart 
cherry trees to bear a larger crop in alternating years (RHC, p.11). Annual crop 
fluctuations further confuse market signals in the tart cherry industry. In 
particular, producers who are trying to determine the position of the tart cherry 
industry on its long-term cycle can be misled by annual production fluctuations 
(Ricks, p.244). Accurate market information regarding the position of the tart 
cherry industry in regard to its long-term production cycle and precise weather 
predictions would assist growers in coordinating their supply with consumer 
demands. 
Another characteristic of the perfectly competitive market that is violated 
in the market for tart cherries is that of easy market exit and entry. An individual 
may enter the tart cherry industry by planting new orchards or buying existing 
orchards. "In both cases, rapidly rising investment requirements are providing 
growing entry barriers for many potential cherry growers" (RHC, p.17). The 
large capital investment requirements that make it difficult to enter the tart cherry 
industry also create barriers to exit. Due to capital investments, tart cherry 
producers cannot easily switch to growing more profitable agricultural crops on 
their land if tart cherry prices drop; cherry trees are not an easily convertible 
asset. 
Consequences of Market Failures 
The primary consequence of market failures in the tart cherry industry is 
to increase risks to tart cherry producers. Producers' risks are increased by 
many of the economic conditions resulting from market failures: low, variable 
prices; high overhead costs; inadequate and undependable market outlets; and 
a reduction of long-run demand for tart cherries. 
In large-crop years, particularly those coinciding with a high point on the 
long-term production cycle, growers receive very low prices for their cherries. 
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Prices often are well below growers' costs of production in years of large 
supplies (Ricks, p.250). Low grower prices can result from a number of market 
failures in the tart cherry industry. Overproduction results from the product 
fluctuation cycles and inadequate market information; growers are prevented 
from leaving the market in years of low prices because of barriers to exit; and 
the existence of few buyers and many sellers leads to unequal market power. 
Short-crop years can also have negative consequences for growers. In 
these years, growers often suffer from high per unit overhead costs. Grower 
investment in machinery such as mechanical harvesters lead to high fixed 
costs. Production investments often work by the principle of economies of size 
and are economical only for large volumes. A small crop year raises the per­
unit fixed costs of such operations and forces producers to use equipment that 
is not economical for small volumes. These factors raise growers' overhead 
costs as a percentage of gross revenue and thus reduce net profit. The 
principal market failure responsible for high per unit overhead costs is producer 
market entry and exit barriers due to high levels of capital investments. 
Some of the biggest risks to producers arise from having undependable 
and/or insufficient market outlets. Undependable market outlets are a particular 
problem for tart cherry producers due to the perishable nature of their product. 
Processing of tart cherries must be done within hours after harvest in order to 
maintain product quality (Marion, p.184). If tart cherry growers have 
undependable processing outlets, they may not be able to achieve this 
necessary coordination and, thus, may lose their crop. The risk of 
undependable market outlets is primarily due to the presence of few buyers and 
many sellers in the market. 
Possibly the worst grower problem occurs when growers are unable to 
sell their crop at any price due to inadequate market outlets. This situation, like 
the existence of low prices, is particularly apt to occur in large-crop years during 
the surplus portion of the long-term cycle. Ricks, Hamm, and Chase-Lansdale 
explain why this situation occurs: 
Because tart cherry production in a given geographical 
area may fluctuate as much as 500% from one year to the 
next, processing facilities with sufficient capacity to handle 
the largest crops in the area would be used at 
approximately 20% of capacity in some of the short-crop 
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years. This type of situation results in high overhead costs 
per pound of processed cherries...[T}here have been 
large-crop years when even the entire industry's facilities 
were insufficient to process the crop within the necessary 
harvest period (RHC, p.14). 
This situation also results from many of the aforementioned market failures in 
the tart cherry industry. Market power imbalance due to the oligopsonistic 
nature of the tart cherry market, barriers to market exit for producers, the 
extreme perishability of tart cherries, and wide production fluctuations all 
contribute to a situation where growers have no market for their cherries. 
A final way in which market failures in the tart cherry industry increase 
risk for tart cherry growers is by reducing long-run demand potential for tart 
cherries and subsequently threatening the viability of tart cherry production. 
Wide fluctuations. in particular, hamper long-term demand growth. High prices 
in short-crop years and wide price and quantity fluctuations frequently lead food 
manufacturers to drop cherries and substitute other ingredients with more stable 
supplies and prices. Long-run demand potential is further reduced by the 
instability of cherry supplies because food manufacturers are deterred from 
developing new cherry products (Ricks, p.250). This trend poses a threat to tart 
cherry producers' livelihoods; if enough manufacturers drop cherries and 
substitute other fruits, demand for tart cherries will decrease significantly and 
many tart cherry producers will be forced out of the industry. The market failure 
most responsible for this situation is lack of complete market information which 
can lead to wide production fluctuations. 
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GROWER INSTITUTIONS IN THE TART CHERRY INDUSTRY 
Producers have reacted to the negative consequences of market failure 
by joining together in an effort to reduce risk. Producer group-action institutions 
have been organized to reduce supply instability, expand demand, and provide 
growers with a more active role in the subsector. Four forms of producer 
institutions in the tart cherry industry are cooperatives, a federal marketing 
order, cooperative-corporation joint ventures, and farmer bargaining 
associations (Marion, p.178-9). 
Cooperatives 
Processing Cooperatives 
One form of producer cooperation in the tart cherry industry that has 
expanded rapidly in recent years is grower-processor cooperatives. In 1970 
approximately 83% of tart cherry processing capacity was controlled by 
investor-owned firms. By 1984 this number had shrunk considerably, with 80 to 
85% of the processing capacity owned by cooperatives and grower-processors 
(Marion, p.181). The trend toward more grower processing, both by processing 
cooperatives and, for the largest growers, individual grower processing, has 
been motivated by two primary factors. The two primary benefits of grower 
integration into processing are better coordination of mechanical harvesting 
with processing and ensured processing outlets for growers' production 
(Marion, p.180). 
The issues of coordination and crop outlets were both highlighted by the 
development and adoption of mechanical harvesting in the tart cherry industry. 
After mechanical harvesting was introduced, producers were able to harvest 
cherries much faster than they could be processed. However, at the time when 
mechanical harvesting was increasing the need for processing, processing 
capacity in the industry declined (RHC, p.48). 
In order to preserve their crop, growers must ensure that their cherries 
are processed within hours after harvest. Vertical integration has proved to be 
the best means for growers to coordinate the increased harvested crop volume 
from mechanical harvesting with processing. Unlike those in most other 
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agricultural industries, the economies of size for processing in the tart cherry 
industry are relatively small. Three or four moderately large growers can jointly 
build a processing plant and have sufficient volume to obtain processing 
economies of size (Marion, p.180). 
As previously mentioned, the second benefit of processing cooperatives, 
ensured processing outlets, can be extremely important to growers in large-crop 
years: "With ownership in a processing facility growers gain access to the 
limited industry processing capacity during the short period of time when it is 
needed" (RHC, p.17). Processing cooperatives thus enable producers to avoid 
one negative consequence of market failures in the tart cherry industry, the lack 
of an immediate outlet for their crop. 
Processing cooperatives have also been formed in the frozen cherry 
market of the tart cherry industry where frozen cherries are remanufactured into 
products such as pie filling. Within the last twenty years, cooperatives have 
become involved in this market through the purchase of pie filling operations, 
such as pie-filling divisions spun-off by large food conglomerates (RHC, p.26). 
Cooperatives have made these purchases in order to assure a market for their 
commodity at the next stage of the production process. Commodity 
cooperatives are willing to accept lower returns on investment than are large 
food firms and thus may be able to economically run pie filling divisions 
abandoned by for-profit food manufacturers. In this way, cooperatives can 
achieve effective forward vertical coordination, enhance their market access 
position, and ensure a market for growers' products at the next step in the 
production process. Through these achievements, processing cooperatives 
help producers counteract the negative effects of market failures in the tart 
cherry industry. 
Marketing Cooperatives 
The growth of tart cherry grower-processing cooperatives and individual 
grower-processors has increased the number of sellers in the frozen cherry 
market and has pushed oligopsonistic market structure in the tart cherry industry 
forward one step in the production process. Instead of agricultural producers, 
the numerous market sellers are now grower-processor cooperatives and 
individual grower-processors; the basically undifferentiated product is now 
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frozen cherries instead of raw cherries; and the few, powerful buyers are now 
food manufacturing firms, instead of investor-owned processors. In an attempt 
to counteract the negative effects of the market power imbalance inherent in the 
oligopsonistic structure, some grower-processor cooperatives and individual 
gro~er-processors have consolidated their production and formed marketing 
cooperatives. Cooperatives whose members include other cooperatives are 
called federated cooperatives. RHC predict that federated marketing 
cooperatives for cherries will become increasingly important in the future (RHC, 
p.71 ). 
Cherry Central Cooperative, Inc, 
One example of a federated marketing cooperative for cherries and other 
processed fruits is Cherry Central Cooperative, Inc. in Traverse City, Michigan. 
Cherry Central has 17 processor member-stockholders, the majority of which 
are cooperatives (Bogard, speech). The primary items manufactured by Cherry 
Central are tart cherries, sweet cherries, apples, blueberries, applesauce, apple 
juice, and other fruit products (Bogard, speech). Cherry Central markets these 
products to retail stores, food service and bakery companies, such as Sara 
Lee® (Bogard, interview). Recent marketing sales totals for Cherry Central 
have averaged approximately 40 million dollars (Bogard, speech). 
Cherry Central was founded in 1973 by a group of five cherry processors. 
These processors had been marketing their tart cherries separately and 
concluded that they would most likely get a higher return for their products if 
they marketed collectively, 
In addition to its marketing services, Cherry Central also provides some 
of the advantages of a supply cooperative for its members. Richard L. Bogard 
describes one of the supply services provided by Cherry Central: 
Cherry Central also operates a can division whereby we 
manufacture the 30 lb. fruit cans that most cherries and 
apples are put in to go to the freezer after the production 
season. Since the production season only runs for a few 
weeks on cherries during the summer...the product has 
to be processed and then moved to the freezer for 
storage. Since all of our members use these 30 lb. fruit 
cans,...by buying steel and owning a can .making 
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manufacturing plant together, they can all share the 
reduced cost of this container (Bogard, speech). 
Cherry Central also owns a machinery manufacturing plant that was 
purchased to continue the development and manufacturing of cherry pitting 
machines and other fruit processing equipment (Bogard, speech). Like the can 
manufacturing plant, the machinery building plant saves the members of Cherry 
Central money, and ensures that they have the production and processing 
inputs they need. 
By consolidating members' production, Cherry Central helps processor 
cooperatives circumvent the superior market power of large food manufacturers. 
And on the supply side, Cherry Central Cooperative enables processors to 
establish less costly, more stable sources for their processing inputs. 
The Tart Cherry Federal Marketing Order 
Another producer group-action institution that was established to help 
reduce price and income fluctuations is the tart cherry federal marketing order. 
When it was established, the federal marketing order had two parts--an 
industry-wide storage program and a demand expansion program. 
Industry-Wide Storage Program 
The industry-wide storage program, which operated in the 1970's and 
early 1980's, attempted to stabilize prices and producer incomes by stabilizing 
the supply of cherries available to the market. The primary purpose of the 
storage program was to store tart cherries in large-crop years and supplement 
tart cherry supplies in short-crop years through the use of a storage reserve 
pool. Economically, this approach was possible "because the price increases 
from large crop to short crop are typically several times greater than the costs for 
storage, interest, and handling of the stored cherries" (Marion, p.182). The most 
serious potential problem of the storage program was the risk of having two or 
more large crop years in succession. 
From the grower's point of view, the expected results of the program were 
higher prices in large-crop years than without the program and more cherries to 
sell in small-crop years. From the point of view of manufacturers, retailers, and 
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consumers, the storage pool was seen as a way to stabilize supplies and prices 
from year to year (RHC, p.62). In his discussion of the tart cherry marketing 
order, Ricks concludes that the storage program stabilized annual supply 
fluctuations somewhat and economically benefited the tart cherry industry 
(Ricks, p.252). 
In 1986, the Secretary of Agriculture decided to terminate the tart cherry 
marketing order storage program based on the results of a continuance 
referendum in which a majority of both growers and processors by tonnage 
voted for continuance of the program, but slightly less than a majority of the 
number of growers voted to continue the program (Ricks, p.252). 
Demand Expansion 
Demand expansion is the second program within the federal tart cherry 
marketing order. The marketing order calls for an industry-wide demand 
expansion program that is financially supported by tart cherry growers. Funds 
for the expansion program are collected from growers through state marketing 
orders. RHC describe the current focus of demand expansion activities: 
Because a high percentage of tart cherries are sold as an 
ingredient for manufacturers of branded food products, 
much of the cherry demand-expansion efforts are aimed 
at increasing the emphasis on cherries in product-line and 
merchandising decisions of food manufacturers and at 
including more cherries in the menus of food service and 
institutional establishments. The demand-expansion 
efforts also involve attempts to: (1) stimulate development 
of new manufactured products using cherries, (2) 
determine obstacles to expanded use of cherries and (3) 
work with food companies to overcome those obstacles to 
expanding demand (RHC, p.37). 
Since demand expansion activities are usually funded by a percentage 
checkoff on marketed production, available funds for demand expansion shrink 
in short cherry crop years. A further reason demand expansion is often 
substantially curtailed in short-crop years is lack of sufficient supplies to support 
an expanded demand (RHC, p.37). 
Although the program is entitled demand expansion, it focuses in part on 
counteracting the negative effects of production fluctuations in an attempt to 
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preserve present manufacturing demand. Thus, this program encompasses 
demand maintenance as well as demand expansion (RHC, p.52). 
Cooperative-Corporation Joint Ventures 
. Cooperative-corporation joint ventures are a third example of producer 
group-action institutions formed in the tart cherry industry to help stabilize 
producer prices and incomes. Cooperative-corporation joint ventures can 
assist tart cherry producers by increasing consumer access to their products 
and expanding demand for products such as cherry pie filling through the use of 
the food company's established brand name (RHC, p.73). 
One existing cooperative-corporation joint venture operates in the retail­
size cherry pie filling market. Pro-Fac, a cooperative that packs retail-size 
cherry pie filling, has a long-term joint venture agreement with Curtice Burns, an 
investor-owned food marketing firm. Pro-Fac provides raw product supplies, 
facilities, investment, and some financing, while Curtice Burns provides the 
brands, marketing activities, and management (Marion, p.181). 
Cooperative-corporation joint ventures can further help tart cherry 
producers by expanding development of new tart cherry products, particularly if 
cherry cooperatives pair with a food marketing corporations with strong brands 
and the ability and willingness to develop new cherry products. 
Tart Cherry Bargaining Associations 
Cooperative bargaining associations are the fourth type of producer 
group-action organization formed in the tart cherry industry. Tart cherry 
bargaining has expanded in recent years, and now encompasses a majority of 
the annual crop. The share of processed tart cherries negotiated by bargaining 
associations measured in cash receipts rose from 44% in 1978 to 80% in 1982 
(Skinner, p.5). 
The rising popularity of bargaining associations can be traced in part to 
their goals for their grower-members, including higher prices, better and more 
accessible market information, and reduced risks. Other goals of cooperative 
bargaining associations include aiding in the price discovery process, reducing 
risks to processors, and reducing annual price fluctuations. 
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One way bargaining associations have been able to increase grower 
prices is by obtaining uniform pricing from all tart cherry processors in a given 
area. Uniform pricing guarantees that processors are not paying more for raw 
cherries than their competitors, and in turn, reduces processors' risks. This risk 
redl,lction is then passed down to producers in the form of slightly higher and 
more stable grower prices (RHC, p.16). 
Cooperative bargaining associations have also sought to increase 
grower prices by altering the market power situation in favor of tart cherry 
growers (RHC, p.73). While the high percentage of tart cherry tonnage 
represented by bargaining associations seems to point to bargaining 
associations' having a high degree of market power, there are limitations to 
bargaining association market power which will be discussed later. 
Cooperative bargaining associations have sought to overcome these limitations 
in an effort to fully exploit their oligopolistic position. 
The dissemination of market information is an important purpose of all 
bargaining associations. In the tart cherry industry, cooperative bargaining 
associations have been able to help build, organize, and publish important 
information in the subsector (RHC, p.74). Market information, such as crop 
estimates, can play an important role in reducing the uncertainties that tart 
cherry producers face. 
The third goal of tart cherry bargaining associations, reducing producer 
risks, has been achieved in some cases. There is a high degree of price and 
inventory risk inherent in the tart cherry subsector, which can be shared by 
different participants in the industry or shouldered by one. Participants in the 
tart cherry industry often are attempting to shift risk-bearing functions away from 
them, onto other participants in the subsector. Risks traditionally have been 
passed down from grocery retailers, wholesalers, and food manufacturers 
through processors to growers. By providing tart cherry growers a degree of 
market influencing ability, bargaining associations have enabled growers to 
shift some of the risks forward to processors (RHC, p.73). 
A new development in the area of tart cherry cooperative bargaining 
associations that may enable them to better achieve their goals is interaction 
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between processing and bargaining cooperatives. RHC describe the potential 
benefits for both organizations from such an arrangement: 
Processing cooperatives can provide useful information to 
bargaining cooperatives in regard to supply and demand 
conditions, market and trade trends, and economic 
conditions affecting processors. These types of 
information can be useful to bargaining associations as 
background for making realistic decisions regarding their 
price and terms of trade negotiations with proprietary 
processors. . .Bargaining cooperatives provide 
information and influence processing cooperatives 
through information to growers, through some dual 
membership in both types of cooperatives, and through 
their bargaining activities as they affect price levels, even 
though bargaining cooperatives do not bargain directly 
with processing cooperatives (RHC, p.71-72). 
Thus, by working with processing cooperatives, bargaining cooperatives may 
be able to provide their producer-members with better market information, 
higher prices, and/or reduced risks. 
Cooperative bargaining associations' contribution to the welfare of tart 
cherry growers through the attainment of producer goals, however, have not 
reached their potential due to limitations on the market power of bargaining 
associations. The market power of tart cherry bargaining associations is limited 
by: (a) the tart cherry tonnage processed by cooperatives, (b) the tart cherry 
tonnage of growers who are not members of a bargaining association, and (c) 
the highly perishable nature of the crop (RHC, p.74). 
Tart cherry bargaining associations traditionally have bargained 
exclusively between growers and investor-owned processors. As the 
importance of cooperative processing has increased and the percentage of tart 
cherries purchased by investor-owned processors has decreased, the role of 
tart cherry bargaining associations has also decreased (Marion, p.183). The 
importance of tart cherry bargaining associations has also decreased as a 
result of a higher percentage of on-farm tart cherry processing, and other factors 
which reduce bargaining association membership. As both forms of grower 
processing have expanded, the tonnage of raw cherries sold by producers has 
decreased and the tonnage of frozen cherries sold by producers has risen 
rapidly. Bargaining associations typically only handle raw cherries, thus tart 
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cherry bargaining has become a "thinner market" (RHC, p.76). The shrinking 
market for raw cherries has decreased the importance of tart cherry bargaining 
associations, particularly because the impact of raw cherry bargaining only 
indirectly affects the market for frozen cherries (RHC, p.19). 
. Tart cherry cooperative bargaining associations' market power has not 
been large for other reasons as well. In particular, the highly perishable nature 
of tart cherries and the fact that variable harvest costs constitute a low 
percentage of the total value of the product both contribute to bargaining 
associations' limited degree of market power (RHC, p.16). 
Mjchigan AgricUltural Cooperative Marketing Association. Inc. (MACMA) 
The Michigan Agricultural Cooperative Marketing Association is the 
Michigan Farm Bureau's marketing affiliate company. It was organized in 1961 
to provide marketing, bargaining, and various group marketing and related 
services. MACMA's major objective is the attainment of full market value for the 
commodities of its over 2,000 farmer-members. 
MACMA is organized by commodity divisions. One group of commodity 
divisions is the fruit for processing group. MACMA fruit divisions influence and 
establish prices, grades and other terms of trade through negotiations with 
processors and various price leadership activities. Newsletters and toll-free 
phone lines provide price, crop and market information (MACMA information 
sheet). 
Within the fruit for processing group, MACMA operates the Red Tart 
Cherry Growers Division. The Red Tart Cherry Growers Division was organized 
in 1968. The division is MACMA's largest membership division with about 900 
members representing about 70% of the annual Michigan crop. The division 
administers the activities of the Michigan Cherry Committee, which is 
responsible for the operation of the statewide red tart cherry and sweet cherry 
promotion and advertising program (MACMA brochure). While MACMA 
provides marketing services for other commodities it handles, it operates strictly 
as a bargaining association with regard to tart cherries. The MACMA Red Tart 
Cherry Growers Division organizes negotiations between growers and 
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processors and publishes an information newsletter for its producer-members 
(Preston). 
The primary role of the division has been to improve tart cherry growers' 
net returns through a variety of programs. These programs include collecting 
and disseminating price and market information, recommending a raw product 
price schedule, working to unify activities between producing states, improving 
crop estimates, and representing the growers' interest in various legislative and 
regulatory issues (Nye, p.170). 
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COOPERATIVE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS IN
 
THE TART CHERRY INDUSTRY
 
Many of the benefits of cooperatives in general apply to tart cherry 
cooperatives. Most noticeably, tart cherry cooperatives have benefited growers 
when they have been organized to provide services that elsewhere are 
unavailable or inadequate. This has particularly been the case with tart cherry 
processing. RHC emphasize this point, stating: "At the present time, the 
industry seems to have sufficient processing capacity to handle most cherry 
crop sizes even with mechanical harvesting. The main contribution to the 
solution has been grower investment in more processing facilities" (RHC, p.49). 
Tart cherry cooperatives have also been able, in some cases, to raise 
growers' net profits. Cooperatives have accomplished this either by increasing 
gross revenues, decreasing costs, or both. Often, tart cherry cooperatives have 
raised revenues for growers. In a number of years tart cherry cooperatives have 
returned somewhat higher average prices to growers than the market at harvest 
time (RHC, p.33). 
Like all agricultural cooperatives, tart cherry cooperatives have reduced 
costs to their members by offering services on an at-cost basis. This principle 
has helped growers save money by spending less to purchase production 
inputs and to process and market their cherries. 
Tart cherry growers have also benefited from the added competition 
cooperatives bring to non-competitive markets. This competition has often led 
to higher prices being offered for growers' cherries by cooperatives and 
investor-owned firms alike. 
The democratic nature of tart cherry cooperatives has also been an asset 
for growers. Growers often value having influence over processing and 
marketing decisions and operations and having a say in the kinds of research 
and development done with their products (Bogard, speech). 
Finally, growers can benefit from the improved coordination cooperatives 
allow between services offered and grower needs. Such coordination often 
concerns non-price services. Non-price services may be of such importance 
that a cooperative that offers certain non-price services may be able to return a 
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lower price to growers than investor-owned firms and still stay in business. 
RHC explain how this might happen: 
A processing cooperative may be able to maintain a 
somewhat lower price (grower return) over a long period 
of years if the cooperative provides special services to the 
grower that the proprietary processors do not. Such 
special services of a processing cooperative might 
include items such as (a) guaranteed processing capacity 
in both large-crop and short-crop years, (b) a willingness 
by the co-op to process an entire crop and market over a 
2-3 year period rather than force the grower to let part of 
the crop drop on the ground, (c) an assured market outlet 
for other fruits raised by the grower, (d) reduced costs for 
growers' purchased inputs. (e) more convenient receiving 
stations, (f) providing a more "just" raw product grading 
system. (g) operating the plant over a longer season to 
accommodate growers, (h) more convenient daily delivery 
schedules for the grower, and (i) providing unusual 
financing to growers under certain conditions (RHC. p.33). 
The added convenience for growers of services such as these may more than 
make up for a lower product price. 
Tart cherry cooperatives are limited by the same factors limiting 
cooperatives in general. Tart cherry cooperatives are not able to control 
production and fix prices at a revenue-maximizing level for growers. They also 
are limited in the degree to which they can raise prices by the elasticity of 
consumer demand for tart cherry products. And while tart cherry cooperatives 
can make the tart cherry market more efficient by eliminating middlemen, they 
cannot eliminate the functions performed by middlemen in the marketing 
system. 
One particularly important limitation of tart cherry cooperatives is the risk­
bearing function they play. When growers form a processing cooperative, for 
instance, they accept the seasonal pricing risk previously borne by processors 
(RHC. p.33). The increasing percentage of tart cherry tonnage processed by 
cooperatives seems to indicate growers' willingness to accept these risks. 
Organized tart cherry bargaining cooperatives, however. may be able to shift 
the risk-bearing function to another participant in the industry. 
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CURRENT FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATIVES IN 
. THE TART CHERRY INDUSTRY 
Many of the current issues influencing agricultural cooperatives in 
general are affecting tart cherry cooperatives. One such issue that was 
previously discussed is increased price and income volatility due to reduced 
government involvement in agriculture. Government involvement in the tart 
cherry industry decreased substantially upon the cessation of the federal 
marketing order tart cherry storage program. The storage program helped 
stabilize grower prices and income by evening out supply fluctuations, and the 
loss of the program has resulted in more price and income fluctuations. A new 
federal storage program may be adopted in the future to decrease price and 
income volatility in the industry. 
The trend toward fewer and larger farms is readily apparent in the tart 
cherry industry. This trend will likely lead to both fewer investor-owned 
processors and fewer tart cherry processing cooperatives as growers become 
increasingly able to achieve necessary processing economies of size on an 
individual basis. 
Another trend developing in agricultural cooperatives in general and 
specifically in the tart cherry industry is toward fewer and larger marketing 
sector firms. As more growers freeze their own cherries and sellers of frozen 
cherries become more numerous, and as the buyers of frozen cherries become 
fewer and larger, the oligopsonistic structure of the frozen cherry market will 
intensify. Increasing market power imbalance against growers may prompt the 
formation of additional cooperative bargaining associations to negotiate for 
frozen cherries. RHC reinforce this possibility, stating: "[C]oordination 
arrangements which center on the market for processed cherries, rather than on 
the raw cherry market. .. , will likely become increasingly important in the future" 
(RHC, p.71). 
Finally, cooperative-corporation joint ventures will likely become more 
common and more important in the tart cherry industry in the future as one way 
to help stabilize producer prices and incomes (RHC, p.73). 
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CASE STUDY 2: THE U.S. FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY 
COOPERATIVES IN THE U.S. FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY 
Farm-raised catfish is the most important aquaculture product in the 
United States (Hinote, p.1). The 361 million pounds of catfish produced in 
1988, for instance, represented about 45 percent of U.S. aquaculture 
production (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14). The farm-raised catfish industry has 
achieved widespread importance in spite of the fact 1hat it is still a very young 
industry in the United States, having been in existence for less than thirty years 
(Hinote, p.1). Farm-raised catfish production is geographically concentrated in 
the southern United States. Mississippi is by far the largest producer. With less 
than 18 percent of U.S. catfish farmers, Mississippi produces about 80 percent 
of the nation's output. Mississippi's 91,000 acres of catfish ponds represent 61 
percent of the total U.S. pond acreage (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14). In total 
production, Mississippi is followed by Alabama and Arkansas. Production per 
acre in the U.S. averages about 4,000 catfish per year (Hinote, p.2). The price 
of farm-raised catfish is relatively stable throughout the year (Hinote, p.1). 
Despite this, catfish farming remains a high risk business due to high capital 
requirements and variables such as weather and disease. 
A number of factors make catfish attractive both to producers and 
consumers. Farm-raised catfish is attractive to consumers because it is 
available year-round and comes in many different forms. In addition, farm­
raised catfish are grown in clean, fresh water and are fed only a commercially 
prepared diet. Farm-raised catfish do not have a strong fishy odor or taste and 
they have a longer shelf life than salt water fish. Farm-raised catfish are an 
economical source of nutritious food; they are high in protein, low in calories, 
and have no cholesterol (Hinote, p.2-3). 
Farm-raised catfish production is attractive to producers for a number of 
reasons. Man-made catfish breeding ponds present a solution to the current 
problem of over-harvested natural waters. In addition, catfish are an attractive 
agricultural crop because they are efficient in converting feed to meat and are 
suited to intensive culture. Furthermore, catfish ponds and other production 
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facilities may be established on land that could not be used for other crops (Lee. 
p.6-7). 
Due to these benefits of catfish production and consumption, the farm­
raised catfish industry has experienced a period of rapid growth since the mid 
1970's. Between 1975 and 1991, catfish production increased more than 2,400 
percent (USDA, 1992, p.6). The industry grew at a compounded annual rate of 
28 percent during the period 1975 to 1980. For 1980 to 1985, the rate of growth 
was an even more rapid 33 percent (Hinote, p.1). But after more than a decade 
of impressive expansion, the catfish industry's growth has stumbled: 
In 1990, catfish growers sold over 360 million 
pounds of catfish to processors. This was an 
increase of 5 percent from the previous year, but 
was seen as a slowdown to an industry that had 
become accustomed to double-digit increases. 
Over the first half of 1991, the rate of expansion 
slowed even further as sales to processors rose 
only 3 percent from the previous year (USDA, 
1991, p.10). 
The largest limiting factor of catfish production is consumer demand. 
Presently, the largest catfish consumers by state are Texas, Louisiana, Illinois, 
Arkansas, and Mississippi. West Coast markets, which are expected to be the 
fastest growing region for catfish consumption in the future, may help stimulate 
flagging industry growth rates (Blackledge, p.5). 
Primary marketing outlets for farm-raised catfish include specialty catfish 
restaurants (mainly located in the southern part of the United States), 
institutional food distributors, retail grocery stores, fish markets, major fish and 
seafood processors, and chain restaurants (Hinote, p.3). 
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REASONS FOR COOPERATIVE FORMATION IN 
"rHE FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY 
Market Failures 
. Cooperatives in the farm-raised catfish industry have been formed out of 
necessity brought on by adverse market conditions stemming from market 
failures in the industry. The catfish industry exhibits the primary market failures 
of all agricultural industries: few buyers, inadequate producer market 
information, and barriers to market entry and exit. 
The ratio of catfish farmer-sellers to processor-buyers is large; although 
approximately 2,000 catfish farmers operate in the United States, there are only 
about 30 processors of catfish (Warren). Producers' selling outlets are even 
more limited on a local basis. In the Alabama catfish industry, for example, only 
two processors operated in the major production area in 1983. One was sold a 
year later, creating a monopoly (Sullivan, p.18). The existence of few buyers 
and many sellers creates an unequal market power relationship that 
disadvantages catfish farmers when selling to processors. 
Another important market failure in the catfish industry is producers' lack 
of necessary market information. Catfish farmers are at a disadvantage 
because processors have greater access to timely, accurate market information 
and use it when buying from individual farmers (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). 
Specifically, catfish farmers are lacking information which would help them plan 
how much to produce. "Continued growth in the production of any agricultural 
commodity requires a balancing act between growers and processors. For both 
parties to prosper, production must be in line with processing capacity and also 
with demand for the finished product" (USDA, 1991, p.10). Producers, however, 
lack information on both processing and consumer demand for their product. 
Lacking this information, catfish farmers have not been able to coordinate their 
supply with market demand, and oversupplies in recent years have resulted 
(Wineholt, July 1990, p.15). 
The third market failure shaping the catfish industry is barriers to market 
entry and exit. These barriers have primarily been due to large capital 
requirements: 
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The capital investment to enter catfish farming is very 
large. Land cost is about $800.00 per acre, and it takes 
$1,200.00 per acre to construct ponds and put in water 
wells. The necessary equipment costs about $500.00 per 
acre. Thus, fixed costs are around $2,500.00 per acre. 
Average operating capital required to produce one acre of 
catfish is about $2,000.00 per acre, bringing the total fixed 
plus operating capital investment to about $4,500.00 per 
acre (Hinote, p.1). 
These high start-up costs prevent many farmers from entering the farm-raised 
catfish industry. Large capital investments also create a barrier to exit in the 
catfish industry. Once land is converted to catfish ponds, the possibility of 
shifting resources to row crops is eliminated (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). High 
capital requirements are exacerbated by the large economies of size inherent in 
catfish production. In catfish farming, costs decrease and production becomes 
more efficient as farm size increases. Large economies of size intensify both 
barriers to entry and exit. Producers must invest more to achieve efficiency and, 
subsequently, larger investments are more difficult to divest. 
Consequences of Market Failures 
Market failures in the farm-raised catfish industry have created a number 
of negative consequences for producers. The most noticeable negative 
consequence has been low producer prices. Low prices have resulted 
primarily from oversupplies of catfish, which, in turn, have resulted from a lack of 
coordination between supply and processor and consumer demand. For 
example, while production acreage in Mississippi quadrupled between 1977 
and 1982, catfish demand did not increase as fast. Overproduction resulted 
and drove down farm prices for catfish to low levels (Wineholt, July 1990, p.15). 
Unfavorable terms of trade have been another consequence of market 
failures in the catfish industry. The imbalance of market power in the catfish 
industry, due to the small number of buyers and large number of sellers, has 
allowed processors to enforce terms of trade that disadvantage producers. 
Examples of unfavorable producer terms of trade include the "off-flavor" 
problem and the problem of abundant oversized fish. 
"Off-flavor" occurs when catfish absorb flavor compounds produced by 
pond organisms. The "off-flavor" condition can be very widespread, affecting up 
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to 45 percent of foodsize catfish held in ponds. Catfish with "off-flavor" are 
unmarketable; some processors refuse fish with the slightest hint of "off-flavor", 
Problems for producers arise in the method used to detect "off-flavor": 
To date, no instrument has been developed that can 
quantify the presence or amount of "off-flavor" in a sample 
of catfish. Instead, processors must rely on individuals 
trained to detect, by smell or taste, any "off-flavor" in fish 
prior to delivery to the plant. This subjective testing has 
presented a number of problems to the industry. Testing 
can be too severe or too lenient. Strict testing can be 
construed as a way for a processor to discriminate unfairly 
when choosing which farmer's fish to accept or not to 
accept any fish. Lenient testing can be construed as a 
way for a processor to pay a lower pond price than the 
more strict processors (Wineholt, July 1990, p.15-16). 
Unfair evaluation of "off-flavor" leaves producers with two undesirable 
outcomes--no market for their product or a low product price. Processors' strict 
quality requirements can be a legitimate way to preserve retail markets, but in 
some cases, they can represent an unfair and capricious exercise of superior 
market power. 
Conditions resulting from the presence of abundant oversized fish also 
have established unfavorable terms of trade for catfish producers. In the catfish 
industry, processing occurs year-round while the catfish growth cycle tends to 
produce mature fish that the farmer is ready to market during a 2- to 3- month 
period (Wineholt, July 1990, p.16). In addition, an informal quota system has 
arisen which limits the amount of catfish a producer can sell to a processor in a 
specified period. As a result, during production booms, catfish that cannot be 
sold are kept in ponds longer, where they eat more and become oversized. 
Oversized catfish have less consumer acceptability and thus are not wanted by 
processors. In order to avoid receiving oversized fish from producers, some 
processors have introduced tiered pricing systems that heavily discount large 
fish. One economist estimates that tiered pricing systems reduced revenues to 
producers by at least $16 million in 1989 (Wineholt, July 1990, p.16). Again, 
specific product characteristic requirements can be legitimate. If the power 
structure were reversed, however, and producers had equal or more market 
power than processors, it is likely that there would be less stringent monthly 
quotas and discounting of oversized fish. . 
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Another negative consequence of market failures in the farm-raised 
catfish industry is undependable and inadequate market outlets. Producers can 
face undependable market outlets because of their small degree of market 
power. Catfish processors are not apt to be concerned about establishing 
goodwill with individual producers and thus can afford to be undependable 
buyers. Inadequate market outlets for catfish production result from a 
combination of market failures. The presence of few buyers and many sellers, a 
lack of producer market information leading to an oversupply of catfish flooding 
the market, and exit barriers preventing catfish farmers from leaving the market 
all contribute to overabundant catfish competing for inadequate market outlets. 
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GROWER INSTITUTIONS IN THE
 
FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY
 
In order to cope with the negative consequences of market failure in their 
industry, catfish farmers have joined together and formed grower institutions. 
These institutions are designed to aid producers by reducing risk, reducing 
costs, increasing market power, and increasing grower prices. David Wineholt 
describes the forms grower-cooperation has taken in the catfish industry: 
Through their united efforts, growers have created a 
substantial presence in the emerging fresh fish industry by 
organizing a bargaining association, establishing mills to 
assure quality feed supplies, and forming a processing 
cooperative through which they can market their 
production (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14). 
Supply Cooperatives 
Catfish feed, at 40 percent of production costs, is the major operating cost 
for catfish producers. Producers' net profits thus are extremely vulnerable to 
changes in the price of feed; an increase in the price of feed ingredients 
proportionately increases the cost of producing farm-raised catfish (Hinote, p.1). 
Supply cooperatives are an effective way of providing producers with stable, 
low-cost catfish feed. Historically, supply cooperatives, by operating on an at­
cost basis, have reduced producers' costs and raised profits: 
The first cooperatively owned catfish feed mill, Producers 
Feed Mill, opened in Isola, MS, in 1974. It provided 
catfish farmers a steady supply of high quality feed at 
affordable prices. Dr. Thomas Wellborn, Jr., Mississippi's 
Cooperative Extension Service, called the mill's opening 
the single most important event in the development of that 
State's catfish industry (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14). 
Supply cooperatives in the catfish industry also benefit producers by 
injecting competition into the feed market and by providing better coordination 
of farmer needs with services provided. 
The catfish industry currently has three primary feed manufacturers: 
Producers Feed Co., Isola, MS; MFC, Madison, MS; and Delta Western, 
Indianola, MS. Producers Feed Co. and MFC are catfish producer-processor 
51
 
cooperatives. All three combined produce approximately 90 percent of the 
catfish feed used in the U.S. (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14-15). 
Processing Cooperatives 
. Processors perform a number of functions in the catfish industry; they 
procure, clean, and package catfish and distribute catfish products. Processors 
"appear to offer the best long-run, large-volume outlet for catfish farmers" (Perry 
and Tilley, p.2). 
There are approximately 30 processing firms in the catfish industry, 
based on a cutoff of the ability to process 2000 pounds of catfish within 8 hours 
(Harrison). This small number is due, in part, to the major economies of size 
that exist in large processing plants (Wineholt, July 1990, p.16). 
Producer cooperation is very active at the processing level of the catfish 
industry. The industry's largest processor is a producer cooperative which also 
performs many marketing functions. Delta Pride Catfish cooperative is the 
single largest buyer of live catfish with a market share close to 40 percent of all 
farm-raised catfish sold. The nearest competitors in size are two publicly­
owned corporations, ConAgra and Hormel, whose processing operations each 
has an estimated market share between 20 to 25 percent (Wineholt, July 1990, 
p.15). 
Processing cooperatives benefit their producer-members in many ways, 
often by counteracting the negative consequences of market failures. 
In the catfish industry, conflicts traditionally have arisen between 
producers and processors. In one "mirror-image" survey designed to compare 
producers' and processors' opinions on issues of mutual concern, there were a 
number of areas of conflict. Disagreements occurred regarding pivotal issues 
such as pricing mechanisms, payment timing, and liability (Sullivan, p.22). 
Processing cooperatives eliminate conflicts between producers and processors 
because processing cooperatives' members are producers; the cooperative 
and its producer-members thus have mutual goals. 
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Processing cooperatives can also reverse existing market power 
arrangements which, due to market failure, disadvantage producers. This 
benefit is described by James C.O. Nyankori: 
[T]here have been changes in market conduct whereby 
catfish farmers, through processing cooperatives, exert a 
considerable degree of market power through vertical 
integration of production and processing activities. With a 
majority share of the market, the producer-cooperative 
has oligopolistic power in the catfish industry (Nyankori, 
p.247). 
Processing cooperatives can also benefit producers by injecting 
competition into non-competitive markets. In markets where only one or two 
processing outlets exist, processing cooperatives may provide an important 
benefit to producers by creating competition and raising product prices. In this 
way, processing cooperatives can help producers avoid the negative 
consequences of the market failure of few buyers. 
Improved market coordination is another benefit of producer-processing 
cooperatives. One example of improved market coordination is the reduction of 
time between harvest and processing. This is an important consideration for 
catfish because, like tart cherries, catfish are highly perishable in their 
unprocessed form. Supply and demand equilibrium is another example of 
improved market coordination. In one survey, processors' reporting projected 
catfish volume required by plants was ranked as very important (Sullivan, p.21). 
Information such as projected processor needs can aid producers in accurately 
supplying the amount demanded. Since processing cooperatives are made up 
of producers, coordination of harvest and processing and of supply and 
demand is facilitated. This coordination helps producers avoid the market 
failure of insufficient market information. 
Processing cooperatives can also play an important role in expanding 
retail and consumer demand. Processing cooperatives can increase final 
demand by creating new value-added catfish products for retail markets. 
One of the most important benefits of catfish processing cooperatives to 
their members is their role as guaranteed market outlets for members' products. 
The attainment of processing market outlets is critical in the catfish industry, in 
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part because inadequate catfish market outlets are one consequence of market 
failures. In 1991, catfish production volume rose significantly in Alabama and 
Mississippi, but fell significantly in Arkansas and Louisiana. Production decline 
in Arkansas and Louisiana has been attributed to closures of processing plants 
(USDA, 1992, p.10). Particularly in the face of investor-owned processing plant 
closures, processing cooperatives offer producers an important outlet for their 
catfish. In addition, processing cooperatives are less likely to enforce 
unfavorable terms of trade, such as monthly quotas, than are investor-owned 
firms. 
Processing cooperatives, however, are limited in their ability to help 
catfish producers. In particular, processing cooperatives cannot economically 
accept an oversupply of catfish for processing. Like investor-owned processors, 
processing cooperatives must be large enough to account for future expansion, 
but small enough to avoid large per unit costs due to excess capacity (USDA, 
1991, p.10). These requirements limit the size of cooperative processing plants 
and their volume capacity. However, because they operate on an at-cost basis, 
processing cooperatives may be able to maintain slightly higher per unit costs. 
Delta Pride Catfish. Inc, 
Like most cooperatives, Delta Pride Catfish was formed out of need. 
Mississippi catfish farmers were overproducing and getting too little for their 
product, time, and effort (Blackledge, p.4). Delta Pride's 115 original farmer­
members joined together because they wanted to control their own economic 
destiny; they did not want to be at the mercy of large investor-owned processors 
(Harrison). When it was formed in April 1981, Delta Pride was the first 
processing and marketing cooperative in the catfish industry (Wineholt, July 
1990, p.15). 
Since its beginnings, Delta Pride has grown significantly in size and 
importance. Part of this growth occurred through acquisition of competing 
processors in the late 1980's. In 1986, Delta Pride, acquired two other major 
Mississippi processors, Fishland, Inc., and Welfed Catfish; and in 1988, it 
acquired Grain Fed Fish, Ltd. (Wineholt, July 1990, p.15). These acquisitions 
helped establish Delta Pride as the single largest buyer of live catfish, with 38 
percent of the national catfish market (Harrison). 
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Today, Delta Pride has 180 farmer-members who collectively control 
over 50 percent of the available live farm-raised catfish in the world (Delta Pride 
video script). Members operate large farms, ranging from 200 to 4,000 acres of 
catfish ponds (Harrison). Each member owns one share of Delta Pride stock for 
each acre of catfish ponds committed to the cooperative. Each share equals 
one vote (Blackledge, p.4). The price of Delta Pride shares started at $150; they 
are now worth $1,300. No new shares are currently being issued (Harrison). 
Delta Pride has four processing plants that process over four million 
pounds of catfish a week (Delta Pride brochure). The cooperative's primary 
plant in Indianola, Mississippi is the largest fresh-water 'fish processing plant in 
the world. In addition, Delta Pride also operates a "further-processing" plant 
(Delta Pride video script). Delta Pride's importance as a processor is illustrated 
by the fact that several other processors base their prices on Delta Pride's rate 
(Wineholt, July 1990, p.15). 
Delta Pride is operated such that while Delta Pride may buy fish only 
from its shareholder-members, its members may sell to any processor they wish 
(Harrison). Delta Pride cannot, however, accept an unlimited amount of its 
members' catfish: "For Delta, taking on additional business is not a simple 
matter. It must consider its marketing ability. Frankly, unsold processed fish 
mean a loss to the cooperative" (Blackledge, p.4). 
All the catfish processed by Delta Pride is sold by its marketing division. 
Delta Pride's marketing division encompasses many activities. Delta Pride 
marketers design and develop new catfish products and brokers go out in the 
field and expand retail markets. Delta Pride catfish is then transported to retail 
markets by the largest company-owned fleet of trucks in the industry. The 
substantial amount of catfish handled by Delta Pride also works to the 
cooperative's advantage. It allows the cooperative to better supply its 
customers from an availability standpoint--a particularly important consideration 
for food-service customers (Delta Pride video script). One of Delta Pride's 
brochures emphasizes this benefit: "Of the 90,000 acres of ponds in 
Mississippi, Delta Pride members own 60,000. It's because of this size that 
Delta Pride can deliver perfect, great tasting catfish, all year round" (Delta Pride 
brochure). 
55 
Delta Pride seems to have had significant success in the catfish industry. 
In his article on price transmission in the catfish industry, Nyankori gives a 
favorable evaluation of the strength and influence of Delta Pride: 
Control over production and processing of catfish has 
given the cooperative a substantial influence in a number 
of critical areas including price discovery, returns to 
farmers, and the competitive position of catfish in the 
market for meats (Nyankori, p.247). 
Catfish Bargaining Cooperatives 
Bargaining in the farm-raised catfish industry takes place between 
producers and processors. Catfish bargaining cooperatives can potentially aid 
producers by helping them avoid the negative effects of two market failures in 
the catfish industry: the presence of few buyers, leading to a high degree of 
processor market power, and catfish farmers' lack of market information. Catfish 
bargaining cooperatives counteract these market failures by increasing 
producers' market power through group action and by providing their members 
with timely, accurate market intelligence. The primary aim of catfish bargaining 
cooperatives, as with all bargaining associations, is to attain the highest price 
and best terms of trade for their members that can be economically justified. 
Bargaining cooperatives need control over a substantial share of the 
supply of a commodity in order to be effective. The geographical concentration 
of catfish production facilitates supply-control and thus increases the chances of 
success for bargaining cooperatives in the catfish industry. 
Catfish bargaining initiated with the formation of the Mississippi Catfish 
Farmers Marketing Association (MCFMA). MCFMA established informal price 
agreements between processors and its farmer-members, and achieved annual 
price increases for 7 of the 8 years it operated. Without formal contracts and 
enforcement powers, however, MCFMA was unable to increase prices further. 
MCFMA was then reorganized into the Catfish Bargaining Association 
(Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). 
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Catfish Bargaining Association (CBA) 
The Catfish Bargaining Association was formed in November 1989 in 
reaction to low producer catfish prices (Allen). CBA started recruiting members 
by asking catfish farmers to sign a master contract empowering CBA to contract 
with- participating processors to establish uniform prices and terms of trade. By 
November 1989, "73 percent of the total catfish water acreage on the 
Mississippi Delta, or about 65,000 acres, was represented by growers who 
signed the bargaining agreement." In August 1990, CBA represented about 80 
percent of catfish acreage in Mississippi (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). 
CBA was also successful in recruiting processors to participate in 
bargaining. Processors representing more than 90 percent of the catfish 
industry purchased fish under CBA agreements which set minimum prices to be 
paid to producers (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.16). 
In his August 1990 article on catfish bargaining, Wineholt evaluated the 
success of CBA up to that point: 
CBA has had a stabilizing effect on the entire industry. 
For example, two nonparticipating processors were 
reportedly paying CBA prices starting in January, while 
another was paying 5 cents per pound less. Further, after 
falling for 15 straight months to 64 cents per pound, the 
average pond-bank price rebounded to 68 cents in 
November 1989, the month that CBA's first marketing 
period began (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.17). 
Wineholt also lists benefits of the Catfish Bargaining Association for other 
sectors of the catfish industry, such as increases in processor wholesale prices 
and stable retail prices (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.17). 
Despite its benefits and apparent success, CBA is not actively bargaining 
at this point in time. One major cause of this inactivity is apparently a problem 
with industry free-riders (Harrison). 
Wineholt sums up his article by stating: 
CBA's formation was triggered by the drop in pond-bank 
price resulting from production and marketing problems 
that lately have become more pronounced. With the 
creation of Producers Feed Mill in the 1970's and Delta 
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Pride Catfish in the 1980's, cooperative action helped 
solve production and marketing problems facing catfish 
farmers at the time. Cooperative action in the form of CSA 
looks to be a timely next step as the farm-raised catfish 
industry enters the 1990's (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.17). 
If CSA is to be the "next step" and play an active role in solving industry 
problems, it will first have to reorganize and solve its free-rider problem. 
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COOPERATIVE BENEFITS AND LIMITATIONS IN
 
THE FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY
 
One way cooperatives can benefit catfish producers is by providing 
otherwise unavailable or inadequate services. For instance, cooperatives have 
been an important factor in supplementing limited processing capacity in the 
catfish industry. 
Another important benefit of catfish cooperatives is their potentiai to raise 
grower net prices, either by increasing gross revenues or decreasing costs. 
Supply cooperatives have reduced producer costs appreciably by reducing the 
cost of catfish feed (Wineholt, July 1990, p.14). Producer revenues were 
increased when the Catfish Bargaining Association increased catfish prices 
during its period of active bargaining. 
As previously mentioned, cooperatives are beneficial when they inject 
competition into noncompetitive markets. This is a particularly important factor 
in the catfish industry which is small and localized. The small size and specialty 
nature of the catfish industry often lead to local monopolies of catfish services. 
Cooperatives can play an important role in dissolving such monopolies. 
The democratic nature of cooperatives can also represent a benefit to 
catfish farmers who are interested in having more input into different steps of the 
production process. 
Finally, as in all industries, cooperatives in the catfish industry benefit 
producers by offering better coordination between producer needs and services 
that are offered. Producer-members of supply, processing, and bargaining 
cooperatives are unquestionably aware of their own needs and, through 
cooperatives, are in a position to meet them. 
Catfish cooperatives are limited by many of the factors limiting 
cooperatives in general. Like all cooperatives, a catfish cooperative cannot 
operate like a cartel by completely controlling supply and fixing prices at a 
profit-maximizing level. Catfish cooperatives also cannot eliminate the 
functions performed by middlemen in the production process, even when they 
are able to eliminate the middlemen themselves. 
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A particularly important limitation of cooperatives in the catfish industry 
previously mentioned is their inability to market unlimited amounts of catfish at 
prices covering production costs. Recent expansion of the catfish industry has 
led to surplus catfish supplies and declining prices for producers and 
processors (Sullivan, p.18). Cooperatives' inability to market the increased 
catfish production is due in part to limited final demand for catfish products. In a 
January 1987 article, Samuel I. Hinote, the one-time president of Delta Pride 
Catfish, stated: 
The biggest factor which is limiting the growth of catfish 
farming is markets for the finished product. I believe that if 
catfish farming remains profitable, markets will be 
developed and the industry will continue to grow at a 
rapid rate (Hinote, p.1). 
I:	 Although catfish production has expanded since 1987 and farmers have 
'I	 continued to increase total revenue, new markets for catfish products have not 
kept pace (Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). 
A 1987 survey conducted by the Alabama Agricultural Experiment 
Station asked administrators and officials in public agencies serving the 
aquacultural industry to rate a series of possible constraints or sources of 
difficulty for the future of Alabama aquaculture. The availability of catfish 
markets was viewed as a major constraint by 84% of the respondents (Molnar 
and EI-Ghamrini, p.14). 
The expansion of markets for catfish products is limited, in turn, by 
problems that prevent sales of catfish. In a survey that asked retailers and 
wholesalers to rate problems that prevent additional sales of catfish products, 
items that received high ratings included consistent supply, quality product, 
price of product, and consumer demand (Perry and Tilley, p.10). If markets for 
catfish are to be expanded to provide for increased catfish production, these 
limiting factors will need to be addressed. 
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CURRENT FACTORS INFLUENCING COOPERATIVES IN 
THE FARM-RAISED CATFISH INDUSTRY 
Certain emerging factors shaping agricultural cooperatives in general, 
such as greater price and income volatility due to reduced government 
involvement in agriculture and fewer and larger marketing sector firms, are not 
key issues in the catfish industry. The third factor that was identified, however-­
a trend toward fewer, larger, and more specialized farms--can be found in the 
catfish industry. Large production economies of size have led to increasing 
individual catfish farm size in an effort to reduce per-unit production costs 
(Wineholt, Aug. 1990, p.14). This trend may increase membership in catfish 
bargaining cooperatives as increased bargaining power through a larger 
degree of supply-control becomes possible. Unlike the experience of the tart 
cherry industry, this trend will probably not decrease processing cooperative 
membership due to large catfish processing economies of size. 
The most pressing issue facing catfish cooperatives today is the rapid 
expansion of the industry and the resulting oversupplies and low producer 
prices. An important concern of catfish cooperatives is the opening up of new 
retail markets for catfish through the expansion of final demand for catfish 
products. In order to achieve market expansion, cooperatives must first address 
the previously mentioned problems that prevent additional sales of catfish 
products. One key problem identified by wholesalers and retailers that 
cooperatives may be able to effectively address is high prices of catfish 
products. 
Nyankori, in his article on price transmission in the catfish industry, 
concludes that causal relationships exist between farm and wholesale catfish 
prices (Nyankori, p.247). His analysis indicates that changes in farm level 
catfish prices directly cause changes in wholesale and retail catfish prices. 
Hence, one way to lower wholesale and retail prices for catfish products is to 
lower farm-level catfish prices. 
Cooperatives can play an important role in lowering farm-level catfish 
prices by lowering production costs. If production costs decrease, farmers can 
afford to lower the price they will accept for their catfish. Cooperatives help 
producers lower costs by providing additional low-cost and efficient services 
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through activities such as bulk purchases of production inputs and volume 
processi ng. 
There is evidence that a drop in farm-level catfish prices, leading to a 
drop in wholesale and retail prices for catfish products, would indeed increase 
demand. Janet E. Perry and Daniel S. Tilley suggest this idea in reporting the 
results of an industry survey: 
Comments about price indicate that wholesalers and 
retailers feel that demand would be stimulated if price 
could be lowered. Responses from both wholesalers and 
retailers point to the possibility of catfish products being 
priced out of the market. These results support prior 
assertions that the price of catfish is a barrier to greater 
consumer acceptance (Perry and Tilley, p.11). 
This view is further supported by the fact that when catfish prices dropped in 
1991, catfish processors' sales rose by more than 9 percent (USDA, 1992, p.7). 
Catfish cooperatives thus can potentially be an active part of the solution 
to insufficient demand for future catfish production levels through their ability to 
effect farm-level price cuts which can be passed through to the wholesale and 
retail levels. Cooperatives may also improve retail demand for catfish products 
through marketing efforts such as promotion and advertising. 
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SUMMARY
 
_ Agricultural cooperatives play a significant role in helping farmers 
circumvent market failures in agricultural industries. Through cooperatives, 
agricultural producers are able to join together and effectively solve their own 
problems. Cooperatives are particularly important for producers in specialty 
crop industries who often face unfavorable market conditions. 
In this paper, economic reasons for cooperative formation and 
cooperative functions in specialty crop industries were described. Benefits, 
limitations, and keys to success .of specialty crop cooperatives were identified; 
and future issues that will influence the growth of agricultural cooperatives were 
discussed. Finally, these issues were applied specifically to two specialty crop 
industries--the U.S. tart cherry and farm-raised catfish industries. 
In assessing the future development of cooperatives in an agricultural 
industry, it is useful to examine factors in the industry that may prompt further 
cooperative development, such as market failures and their consequences. 
Market failures and negative consequences of market failures may lead to 
further development of cooperatives in specialty crop industries. The path 
cooperative development has taken in the U.S. tart cherry and farm-raised 
catfish industries also lends some insight into the possible roles of cooperatives 
in other specialty crop industries. 
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